One of the exaggerated nuggets of official Thai history focuses on Siamese independence in December 1767 after its capital Ayutthaya had been sacked by converging Burmese armies seven months earlier.
Myanmar President Thein Sein, left, and Prime Minister Yingluck Shinawatra inspect a guard of honour at Government House last year. Once traditional rivals, both Thailand and Myanmar now need each other—and must work together—for their economic prosperity and peace.
It is said that the reclamation of independence was attributable to King Taksin's uncommon valour and extraordinary skill in military leadership, strategy and organisation.
While this story is half true, it signifies two ancient rival empires and deep-seated foes whose future directions are as entwined as their recent pasts have diverged. With the contrasting fate and fortunes of ancient Burma and Siam, Myanmar and Thailand must find ways to cooperate and collaborate to grow together as they aim for democratic transition, social stability and sustained economic development.
The King Taksin tale in Thai history conveniently omits the fact that Ava, Burma's capital at the time, was being besieged by Chinese hordes who had invaded from the north. Instead of recalling his armies immediately to defend the capital, King Hsinbyushin held off the Chinese while telling his commanding generals to finish the job in Siam. They did. The once-glorious Ayutthaya Kingdom ended then and there. The Burmese armies then managed to return and beat back the Chinese invaders, leaving only a small garrison at Ayutthaya that was subsequently routed by King Taksin whose reign lasted just 15 years before the current Chakri Dynasty took over to this day.
In the historical narrative of war and conquest between Burma and Siam, the Burmese mostly had the upper hand vis-a-vis the Siamese. Only during a brief period in the early 17th century, under their most ingenious military strategist King Naresuan, did the Siamese take the battle into central Burma. For much of the competing empire years, it was the Burmese who went on the march. Burma was fundamentally a warrior state, whereas Siam was quintessentially a trading nation. One kingdom was wholly preoccupied with war and conquest, the other with trade and commerce. Mixed with geographical location and terrain and the course of history, these DNA strands in their respective peoples, lands and nationhood explain where Thailand and Myanmar stand today.
Geography was decisive. Burma was next to British India. Being a warrior race, the Burmese fought three wars against the expansionist British in the 19th century and lost each time, culminating in the ignominious dissolution of the Burmese monarchy in 1885. Each Burmese defeat partly enticed the Siamese to make concessions to the British, capped by the transfer of the northern Malay states to Britain in 1909. After Britain annexed Burma, the Siamese also made concessions to French imperialists who were pressing from Indochina. In 1893, the French gained much of what is Laos and Cambodia today. Such is the close historical parallel between Burma and Siam, between a warrior culture that could not withstand Western imperialist forces and a culture of slippery but pragmatic Siamese speak that survived.
The intervening 20th century also blew different storms towards the two nations. Burma eventually regained independence and became a thriving democracy in the 1950s before an autarkic military rule set in by 1962. After a quarter century of insularity, it has opened up again in fits and starts, now beset by baggage from its past. Burma's unruly ethnic composition and mountainous terrain have posed challenges for governance and stability. Its repressed superiority complex may now be at the heart of the widening religious and sectarian violence after the political openings and reforms from August 2011, when opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi and President Thein Sein first met.
By contrast, Thailand, as Siam was called from 1939, over much of the same period from 1957 to 1988 mostly harboured military regimes of different shades that were open to business, trade and investment, perhaps because of its lack of colonisation and its proclivity for trade and commerce. The generals empowered development technocrats to run the economy, laying the groundwork for four decades of relative economic boom. The long boom spawned growing middle classes that promoted gradual democratisation. But the boom was intense and its fruits were too concentrated in the upper and middle echelons, and they did not sufficiently cascade into the lower rungs.
Thailand's social inequalities and economic disparities over time were later exploited by Thaksin Shinawatra. And Thailand has been stuck in a holding pattern since the 2006 military coup that deposed him. Thaksin's forces have won all the elections since 2001 but are unable to rule and lead resolutely, whereas his adversaries can stymie and stonewall to keep him at bay but have been unable to win once at the polls.
After Burma and Siam's paths diverged over a century ago, Myanmar and Thailand have reconnected in a new orbit of the 21st century. Thailand now relies on Myanmar for much of its gas supply (main source of electricity generation), labour force, and security needs, such as drugs suppression.
Without Myanmar, Thailand would face power blackouts and skyrocketing wages. For its part, Myanmar has shelved its nuclear weapons programme, and has gained from workers' remittances, as well as aid, loans, investment deals, and capacity-building programmes from Thailand. The Bank of Thailand, for example, assisted with the recent float of the kyat.
Thailand also no longer officially supports the hitherto "buffer" policy of aiding, abetting and sheltering ethnic minorities, such as the Shan and the Karen, who have battled against the Tatmadaw. In fact, there is now a consensus in Thailand over its Myanmar policy. All Thai governments, whether under current Prime Minister Yingluck Shinawatra or the opposing former prime minister Abhisit Vejjajiva in 2008-11, have pursued cooperation and collaboration in all matters of bilateral trade and development with Myanmar. The same consensus, for example, does not hold with Thai policy towards Cambodia.
The current big deal in Myanmar-Thai relations is the Dawei megaproject. What both sides must do is to take a long-term view and avoid myopic parochial interests. The multi-billion-dollar deal began in 2008 when Thai construction conglomerate Italian-Thai Development was awarded a concession to develop 250 square kilometres centring on Dawei. As the project languished, the Yingluck government has apparently shouldered the burden and appears poised to undertake investments with public funds that may benefit ITD.
In addition, Thaksin lurks in the background as he has reportedly expressed investment interests in relation to the project, spending Songkran day in Myanmar with Defence Commander-in-Chief Gen Min Aung Hlaing. Myanmar's authorities would do well not to repeat the mistake of Cambodia by taking sides in Thailand's deeply divided society.
Myanmar's dealings with Thailand should be multi-faceted and inclusive of all major stakeholders. The same goes the other way round. Thailand's government should extend goodwill gestures and deal with Myanmar's principal stakeholders in a comprehensive fashion, and not favour any particular party or faction with vested economic and business interests in mind.
More broadly, Thailand is Myanmar's corridor to Asean, and Myanmar's awakened presence has turned mainland Southeast Asia into a beckoning and burgeoning region that will only expand in GDP terms. The combined consumer market of Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar and Thailand, along with connected links to Vietnam, Yunnan and Malaysia exceeds 350 million, underpinned by abundant natural resources and growing transport and communications connectivity. The economies of this region are set to grow on their own, overlapping with some of the promises of the Asean Community after 2015. The challenge will be politics, big and small.
The big politics will be how to keep a major-powers balance in mainland Southeast Asia, leveraging the United States, Japan and Asean on the one hand and China on the other. This region is China's natural sphere of influence but it must be kept in check by other major powers to ensure that regional interests are kept in a workable and mutually beneficial mix. No major power should be allowed to dominate mainland Southeast Asia. Myanmar and Thailand can leverage the other major players to achieve this objective.
The small politics will be within. Notwithstanding shortcomings and setbacks, Myanmar's democratic development must remain on track, while Thai democracy must consolidate and entrench beyond elections. In both countries, democratic institutions to promote checks and balances, participation, and transparency and accountability are imperative. Myanmar and Thailand may be at different stages on different roads but their destinations are so close that they must find ways to synergise now as much as they once fought so fiercely.
