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| A road to now here? A construction w orker on the road being built by Italian-Thai Development from Ban Phu Namron in Kanchanaburi to the Dawei deep-sea port project. Dawei appears to be dying a slow death. THITI WANNAMONTHA |
No matter how hard it tries, the government keeps coming up short on its planned development of the Dawei deep-sea port in Myanmar.
The back-to-back visits last month by Prime Minister Yingluck Shinawatra to Japan, immediately followed by Prime Minister Shinzo Abe in Myanmar, should signal once and for all that Japanese capital for Dawei development is not forthcoming. It is time to pull the plug on Dawei. The authorities need to look for an alternative port development strategy inside Thailand.
Every time there is ostensibly good news about Dawei, it invariably comes from the Thai government, not from the Japanese. During and after Ms Yingluck's trip to Tokyo as part of an international conference on Asia's future last week, the prime minister and her accompanying cabinet members kept insisting that Japanese businesses were interested in the Dawei port development and also Thailand's mega-infrastructure investments and flood-prevention projects.
The media somehow have not sufficiently probed whether Dawei is appealing in the eyes of Japanese investors. So what Thai government leaders say about Dawei gets reported with one-sided convenience
In truth, Dawei is dying a slow death and Thilawa is the real Dawei.
Mr Abe's visit, the first by a Japanese leader in 36 years, was a comprehensive offensive. Japan gave fresh aid and soft loans and forgave past debts in a combined multi-billion-dollar package, announced and signed with much fanfare. It was also high on symbolism and geopolitical significance.
After Chinese inroads into Myanmar in recent years, Japan has come to reclaim its geopolitical space. Tokyo has been a long-standing investor, low-key donor and patient partner for Myanmar through thick and thin, from the years of military dictatorship to the ongoing political opening and economic reforms. These are the fruits of progress Japan simply will not forfeit to China.
And Mr Abe found receptive ears in Myanmar, whose leaders are wary of overdependence on the Chinese. One key Myanmar minister called Japan a "more credible partner", an insinuation not lost on watchers of the Japan-China rivalry in mainland Southeast Asia.
Included in Japan's substantial aid and loan package was the port development at Thilawa, just 25km south of Yangon. The Thilawa area under development is around 2,000 hectares, about one tenth of the size of Dawei, over which Thai construction giant Italian-Thai Development (ITD) was granted a development concession by Myanmar's military regime in 2008.
In Thilawa, the Japanese government and private investors have put their money where their mouth has been. More than US$200 million (6 billion baht) have been earmarked as soft loans for Thilawa port development and assorted facilities, potentially with more to come. Dawei did not figure in Mr Abe's Myanmar visit.
The Japanese naturally will not display their relative apathy toward Dawei in public. Why should they finance upwards of $8.5 billion in Dawei's initial phase for Thai benefit in the main? Who can blame them ?
When the Japanese government and business leaders showed interest in Thailand's planned high-speed trains, it was their concession and consolation. Assisting with Thai high-speed trains would also allow Japan to compete with China as a supplier.
The Myanmar government has also shown tepid support at best. Like Japan, it is not in a position to reject Dawei in public. If the Thais can get it financed, the Myanmar side seems willing to go along _ or so it appears. There has been no firm and resolute statement of support for Dawei from the Myanmar side, only self-promoting remarks from Thai government leaders.
Thilawa is a mutual boon for Myanmar and Japan. Dawei is certainly beneficial to Thailand as a port centre, energy source and general development lifeline, but its benefits to Myanmar as host and Japan as financier are uncertain, perhaps even problematic on environmental, health and human development grounds. Thus there is little future for Thailand's Dawei scheme.
Apart from financing constraints, Dawei poses multiple risks.
Evictions of villagers are necessary but may not be forthcoming. Logistics are lacking. Human resource challenges are rife. The sea at Dawei is not naturally deep. ITD as a private sector concern stands to benefit from government backing and arrangement, when its original concession on crony terms has lost value
Above all risks is the security imperative. Dawei is not in Thailand. While its development requires massive funding, it will be liable to the vicissitudes of Myanmar's new politics and growing sectarian and religious vulnerabilities. Chasing after the Dawei pipedream is like pouring good public resources over ITD's private misfortune.
If such a chase persists, Dawei will smell increasingly fishy because former prime minister Thaksin Shinawatra, Ms Yingluck's older brother, has reportedly expressed investment interests in Dawei-related projects. His April meeting with Myanmar's Defence Commander-in-Chief Gen Min Aung Hlaing has raised suspicions of potential conflicts of interest in the pursuit of Dawei's development. Similarly, ITD's relationship with government insiders would come under scrutiny if what seems like its lost cause is revitalised by government resources.
To be sure, Dawei preceded Ms Yingluck. It was during the previous government under Abhisit Vejjajiva that Thailand looked to Myanmar as an industrial development zone to skirt around stringent local environmentaland health standards. The polluting industries of Map Ta Phut, Mr Abhisit said publicly, can be located and confined to Thai-run industrial enclaves in Myanmar.
The misguided Dawei scheme is therefore not just about this or that Thai government but about Thailand's development strategy going forward.
Although the eastern seaboard is exhausted, the Laem Chabang port area is still adequate for further development. An increase in capacity at Laem Chabang could be equivalent to one quarter to one third of a new sea port. At the same time, the Map Ta Phut industrial zone requires government interaction and dialogue with relevant civil society groups.
Thailand's longer-term industrial development will need to be more inclusive and broad. Without civil society participation, future development projects will be difficult due to a lack of trust and goodwill. But even increased capacity on the Eastern Seaboard will not be enough for the expanding economy and future development requirements, especially energy supplies.
The government must ensure that its planned.2-trillion-baht infrastructure plan, especially the massive rail projects, provide sufficient efficiency gains, reduce transaction costs and yield multiplier effects to lessen the near-term need for a new port such as Dawei. Apart from an expanded Laem Chabang and more efficient rail and logistics, Thailand may still need a new port in the next decade. This is where the debate should be and it should start with locating it on Thai territory under Thailand's complete control.
Thitinan Pongsudhirak is associate professor and director of the Institute of Security and International Studies, Faculty of Political Science, Chulalongkorn University.
